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Abstract
Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff,
1978) broadly refers to humans’ ability to rep-
resent the mental states of others, including their
desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to
train a machine to build such models too. We de-
sign a Theory of Mind neural network – a ToM-
net – which uses meta-learning to build models
of the agents it encounters, from observations
of their behaviour alone. Through this process,
it acquires a strong prior model for agents’ be-
haviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to
richer predictions about agents’ characteristics
and mental states using only a small number of
behavioural observations. We apply the ToM-
net to agents behaving in simple gridworld en-
vironments, showing that it learns to model ran-
dom, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learn-
ing agents from varied populations, and that it
passes classic ToM tasks such as the “Sally-
Anne” test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can
hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that
this system – which autonomously learns how to
model other agents in its world – is an impor-
tant step forward for developing multi-agent AI
systems, for building intermediating technology
for machine-human interaction, and for advanc-
ing the progress on interpretable AI.
*Corresponding author: ncr@google.com.
1. Introduction
For all the excitement surrounding deep learning and deep
reinforcement learning at present, there is a concern from
some quarters that our understanding of these systems is
lagging behind. Neural networks are regularly described
as opaque, uninterpretable black-boxes. Even if we have
a complete description of their weights, it’s hard to get a
handle on what patterns they’re exploiting, and where they
might go wrong. As artificial agents enter the human world,
the demand that we be able to understand them is growing
louder.
Let us stop and ask: what does it actually mean to “un-
derstand” another agent? As humans, we face this chal-
lenge every day, as we engage with other humans whose
latent characteristics, latent states, and computational pro-
cesses are almost entirely inaccessible. Yet we function
with remarkable adeptness. We can make predictions about
strangers’ future behaviour, and infer what information
they have about the world; we plan our interactions with
others, and establish efficient and effective communication.
A salient feature of these “understandings” of other agents
is that they make little to no reference to the agents’ true
underlying structure. We do not typically attempt to esti-
mate the activity of others’ neurons, infer the connectivity
of their prefrontal cortices, or plan interactions with a de-
tailed approximation of the dynamics of others’ hippocam-
pal maps. A prominent argument from cognitive psychol-
ogy is that our social reasoning instead relies on high-
level models of other agents (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992).
These models engage abstractions which do not describe
the detailed physical mechanisms underlying observed be-
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haviour; instead, we represent the mental states of others,
such as their desires, beliefs, and intentions. This abil-
ity is typically described as our Theory of Mind (Premack
& Woodruff, 1978). While we may also, in some cases,
leverage our own minds to simulate others’ (e.g. Gordon,
1986; Gallese & Goldman, 1998), our ultimate human un-
derstanding of other agents is not measured by a 1-1 corre-
spondence between our models and the mechanistic ground
truth, but instead by how much these models afford for
tasks such as prediction and planning (Dennett, 1991).
In this paper, we take inspiration from human Theory of
Mind, and seek to build a system which learns to model
other agents. We describe this as a Machine Theory of
Mind. Our goal is not to assert a generative model of
agents’ behaviour and an algorithm to invert it. Rather, we
focus on the problem of how an observer could learn au-
tonomously how to model other agents using limited data
(Botvinick et al., 2017). This distinguishes our work from
previous literature, which has relied on hand-crafted mod-
els of agents as noisy-rational planners – e.g. using inverse
RL (Ng et al., 2000; Abbeel & Ng, 2004), Bayesian in-
ference (Lucas et al., 2014; Evans et al., 2016), Bayesian
Theory of Mind (Baker et al., 2011; Jara-Ettinger et al.,
2016; Baker et al., 2017) or game theory (Camerer et al.,
2004; Yoshida et al., 2008; Camerer, 2010; Lanctot et al.,
2017). In contrast, we learn the agent models, and how to
do inference on them, from scratch, via meta-learning.
Building a rich, flexible, and performant Machine Theory
of Mind may well be a grand challenge for AI. We are not
trying to solve all of this here. A main message of this
paper is that many of the initial challenges of building a
ToM can be cast as simple learning problems when they are
formulated in the right way. Our work here is an exercise
in figuring out these simple formulations.
There are many potential applications for this work. Learn-
ing rich models of others will improve decision-making in
complex multi-agent tasks, especially where model-based
planning and imagination are required (Hassabis et al.,
2013; Hula et al., 2015; Oliehoek & Amato, 2016). Our
work thus ties in to a rich history of opponent modelling
(Brown, 1951; Albrecht & Stone, 2017); within this con-
text, we show how meta-learning could be used to fur-
nish an agent with the ability to build flexible and sample-
efficient models of others on the fly. Such models will
be important for value alignment (Hadfield-Menell et al.,
2016) and flexible cooperation (Nowak, 2006; Kleiman-
Weiner et al., 2016; Barrett et al., 2017; Kris Cao), and
will likely be an ingredient in future machines’ ethical deci-
sion making (Churchland, 1996). They will also be highly
useful for communication and pedagogy (Dragan et al.,
2013; Fisac et al., 2017; Milli et al., 2017), and will thus
likely play a key role in human-machine interaction. Ex-
ploring the conditions under which such abilities arise can
also shed light on the origin of our human abilities (Carey,
2009). Finally, such models will likely be crucial mediators
of our human understanding of artificial agents.
Lastly, we are strongly motivated by the goals of making ar-
tificial agents human-interpretable. We attempt a novel ap-
proach here: rather than modifying agents architecturally to
expose their internal states in a human-interpretable form,
we seek to build intermediating systems which learn to re-
duce the dimensionality of the space of behaviour and re-
present it in more digestible forms. In this respect, the pur-
suit of a Machine ToM is about building the missing in-
terface between machines and human expectations (Cohen
et al., 1981).
1.1. Our approach
We consider the challenge of building a Theory of Mind as
essentially a meta-learning problem (Schmidhuber et al.,
1996; Thrun & Pratt, 1998; Hochreiter et al., 2001; Vilalta
& Drissi, 2002). At test time, we want to be able to en-
counter a novel agent whom we have never met before, and
already have a strong and rich prior about how they are go-
ing to behave. Moreover, as we see this agent act in the
world, we wish to be able to collect data (i.e. form a poste-
rior) about their latent characteristics and mental states that
will enable us to improve our predictions about their future
behaviour.
To do this, we formulate a meta-learning task. We con-
struct an observer, who in each episode gets access to a
set of behavioural traces of a novel agent. The observer’s
goal is to make predictions of the agent’s future behaviour.
Over the course of training, the observer should get better
at rapidly forming predictions about new agents from lim-
ited data. This “learning to learn” about new agents is what
we mean by meta-learning. Through this process, the ob-
server should also learn an effective prior over the agents’
behaviour that implicitly captures the commonalities be-
tween agents within the training population.
We introduce two concepts to describe components of this
observer network and their functional role. We distinguish
between a general theory of mind – the learned weights
of the network, which encapsulate predictions about the
common behaviour of all agents in the training set – and
an agent-specific theory of mind – the “agent embedding”
formed from observations about a single agent at test time,
which encapsulates what makes this agent’s character and
mental state distinct from others’. These correspond to a
prior and posterior over agent behaviour.
This paper is structured as a sequence of experiments of
increasing complexity on this Machine Theory of Mind
network, which we call a ToMnet. These experiments
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showcase the idea of the ToMnet, exhibit its capabilities,
and demonstrate its capacity to learn rich models of other
agents incorporating canonical features of humans’ Theory
of Mind, such as the recognition of false beliefs.
Some of the experiments in this paper are directly inspired
by the seminal work of Baker and colleagues in Bayesian
Theory of Mind, such as the classic food-truck experiments
(Baker et al., 2011; 2017). We have not sought to directly
replicate these experiments as the goals of this work differ.
In particular, we do not immediately seek to explain human
judgements in computational terms, but instead we empha-
sise machine learning, scalability, and autonomy. We leave
the alignment to human judgements as future work. Our ex-
periments should nevertheless generalise many of the con-
structions of these previous experiments.
Our contributions are as follows:
• In Section 3.1, we show that for simple, random
agents, the ToMnet learns to approximate Bayes-
optimal hierarchical inference over agents’ character-
istics.
• In Section 3.2, we show that the ToMnet learns to infer
the goals of algorithmic agents (effectively perform-
ing few-shot inverse reinforcement learning), as well
as how they balance costs and rewards.
• In Section 3.3, we show that the ToMnet learns to
characterise different species of deep reinforcement
learning agents, capturing the essential factors of vari-
ations across the population, and forming abstract em-
beddings of these agents. We also show that the ToM-
net can discover new abstractions about the space of
behaviour.
• In Section 3.4, we show that when the ToMnet is
trained on deep RL agents acting in POMDPs, it im-
plicitly learns that these agents can hold false beliefs
about the world, a core component of humans’ Theory
of Mind.
• In Section 3.5, we show that the ToMnet can be
trained to predict agents’ belief states as well, reveal-
ing agents’ false beliefs explicitly. We also show that
the ToMnet can infer what different agents are able to
see, and what they therefore will tend to believe, from
their behaviour alone.
2. Model
2.1. The tasks
Here we describe the formalisation of the task. We assume
we have a family of partially observable Markov decision
processes (POMDPs) M = ⋃jMj . Unlike the standard
formalism, we associate the reward functions, discount fac-
tors, and conditional observation functions with the agents
rather than with the POMDPs. For example, a POMDP
could be a gridworld with a particular arrangement of walls
and objects; different agents, when placed in the same
POMDP, might receive different rewards for reaching these
objects, and be able to see different amounts of their local
surroundings. The POMDPs are thus tuples of state spaces
Sj , action spaces Aj , and transition probabilities Tj only,
i.e. Mj = (Sj , Aj , Tj). In this work, we only consider
single-agent POMDPs, though the extension to the multi-
agent case is simple. When agents have full observability,
we use the terms MDP and POMDP interchangeably. We
write the joint state space over all POMDPs as S =
⋃
j Sj .
Separately, we assume we have a family of agents A =⋃
iAi, with corresponding observation spaces Ωi, condi-
tional observation functions ωi(·) : S → Ωi, reward func-
tions Ri, discount factors γi, and resulting policies pii, i.e.
Ai = (Ωi, ωi, Ri, γi, pii). These policies might be stochas-
tic (as in Section 3.1), algorithmic (as in Section 3.2), or
learned (as in Sections 3.3–3.5). We do not assume that the
agents’ policies pii are optimal for their respective tasks.
The agents may be stateful – i.e. with policies parame-
terised as pii(·|ωi(st), ht) where ht is the agent’s (Markov)
hidden state – though we assume agents’ hidden states do
not carry over between episodes.
In turn, we consider an observer who makes potentially par-
tial and/or noisy observations of agents’ trajectories, via
a state-observation function ω(obs)(·) : S → Ω(obs), and
an action-observation function α(obs)(·) : A → A(obs).
Thus, if agent Ai follows its policy pii on POMDP Mj
and produces trajectory τij = {(st, at)}Tt=0, the observer
would see τ (obs)ij = {(x(obs)t , a(obs)t )}Tt=0, where x(obs)t =
ω(obs)(st) and a
(obs)
t = α
(obs)(at). For all experiments
we pursue here, we set ω(obs)(·) and α(obs)(·) as identity
functions, so that the observer has unrestricted access to
the MDP state and overt actions taken by the agents; the
observer does not, however, have access to the agents’ pa-
rameters, reward functions, policies, or identifiers.
We set up the meta-learning problem as follows. ToM-
net training involves a series of encounters with individual
agents, together with a query for which the ToMnet has to
make a set of predictions. More precisely, the observer sees
a set of full or partial “past episodes”, wherein a single, un-
labelled agent, Ai, produces trajectories, {τij}Npastj=1 , as it
executes its policy within the respective POMDPs, Mj .
Generally, we allow Npast to vary, sometimes even set-
ting it to zero. The task for the observer is to predict the
agent’s behaviour (e.g. atomic actions) and potentially its
latent states (e.g. beliefs) on a “current episode” as it acts
within POMDPMk. The observer may be seeded with a
partial trajectory inMk up to time t.
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The observer must learn to predict the behaviour of many
agents, whose rewards, parameterisations, and policies
may vary considerably; in this respect, the problem resem-
bles the one-shot imitation learning setup recently intro-
duced in Duan et al. (2017) and Wang et al. (2017). How-
ever, the problem statement differs from imitation learning
in several crucial ways. First, the observer need not be able
to execute the behaviours itself: the behavioural predictions
may take the form of atomic actions, options, trajectory
statistics, or goals or subgoals. The objective here is not
to imitate, but instead to form predictions and abstractions
that will be useful for a range of other tasks. Second, there
is an informational asymmetry, where the “teacher” (i.e.
the agent Ai) may conceivably know less about the envi-
ronment state st than the “student” (i.e. the observer), and
it may carry systematic biases; its policy, pii, may therefore
be far from optimal. As a result, the observer may need
to factor in the likely knowledge state of the agent and its
cognitive limitations when making behavioural predictions.
Finally, as a ToM needs to operate online while observing
a new agent, we place a high premium on the speed of in-
ference. Rather than using the computationally costly algo-
rithms of classical inverse reinforcement learning (e.g. Ng
et al., 2000; Ramachandran & Amir, 2007; Ziebart et al.,
2008; Boularias et al., 2011), or Bayesian ToM (e.g. Baker
et al., 2011; Nakahashi et al., 2016; Baker et al., 2017), we
drive the ToMnet to amortise its inference through neural
networks (as in Kingma & Welling, 2013; Rezende et al.,
2014; Ho & Ermon, 2016; Duan et al., 2017; Wang et al.,
2017).
2.2. The architecture
To solve these tasks, we designed the ToMnet architecture
shown in Fig 1. The ToMnet is composed of three modules:
a character net, a mental state net, and a prediction net.
The goal of the character net is to characterise the pre-
sented agent, by parsing observed past episode trajectories,
{τ (obs)ij }Npastj=1 , into a character embedding, echar,i. Here we
choose to parse each past episode independently using a
learned neural net, fθ, as echar,ij = fθ
(
τ
(obs)
ij
)
, and sum
these to form the embedding echar,i =
∑Npast
j=1 echar,ij .
The goal of the mental state net is to mentalise about
the presented agent during the current episode (i.e. infer
its mental state; Dennett, 1973; Frith & Frith, 2006), by
parsing the current episode trajectory, τ (obs)ik , up to time
t − 1 into a mental state embedding, emental,i, using a
learned neural net, gφ. This takes the form emental,i =
gφ
(
[τ
(obs)
ij ]0:t−1, echar,i
)
. For brevity, we drop the agent
subscript, i.
Lastly, the goal of the prediction net is to leverage the char-
Figure 1. ToMnet architecture. The character net parses an
agent’s past trajectories from a set of POMDPs to form a character
embedding, echar. The mental state net parses the agent’s trajec-
tory on the current episode, to form an embedding of its mental
state, emental. These embeddings are fed into the prediction net,
which is then queried with a current state. This outputs predic-
tions about future behaviour, such as next-step action probabili-
ties (pˆi), probabilities of whether certain objects will be consumed
(cˆ), and predicted successor representations (ŜR; Dayan, 1993).
acter and mental state embeddings to predict subsequent
behaviour of the agent. For example, next-step action pre-
diction takes the form of estimating the given agent’s pol-
icy with pˆi(·|x(obs)t , echar, emental). We also predict other
behavioural quantities, described below. We use a shared
torso and separate heads for the different prediction targets.
Precise details of the architecture, loss, and hyperparame-
ters for each experiment are given in Appendix A. We train
the whole ToMnet end-to-end.
2.3. Agents and environments
We deploy the ToMnet to model agents belonging to a
number of different “species” of agent. In Section 3.1,
we consider species of agents with random policies. In
Section 3.2, we consider species of agents with full ob-
servability over MDPs, which plan using value iteration.
In Sections 3.3 – 3.5, we consider species of agents with
different kinds of partial observability (i.e. different func-
tions ωi(·)), with policies parameterised by feed-forward
nets or LSTMs. We trained these agents using a version of
the UNREAL deep RL framework (Jaderberg et al., 2017),
modified to include an auxiliary belief task of estimating
the locations of objects within the MDP. Crucially, we did
not change the core architecture or algorithm of the ToM-
net observer to match the structure of the species, only the
ToMnet’s capacity.
The POMDPs we consider here are all gridworlds with a
Machine Theory of Mind
partial past traj. current state
0
1
pi
trained on
α= 0. 01
predicted action
· ↓ → ↑ ←
0
1
pi
trained on
α= 3
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 2. Example gridworld in which a random agent acts.
(a) Example past episode. Coloured squares indicate objects. Red
arrows indicate the positions and actions taken by the agent. (b)
Example query: a state from a new MDP. Black dot indicates
agent position. (c) Predictions for the next action taken by the
agent shown in (a) in query state (b). Top: prediction from ToM-
net trained on agents with near-deterministic policies. Bottom:
prediction from ToMnet trained on agents with more stochastic
policies.
common action space (up/down/left/right/stay), determin-
istic dynamics, and a set of consumable objects, as de-
scribed in the respective sections and in Appendix C. We
experimented with these POMDPs due to their simplicity
and ease of control; our constructions should generalise to
richer domains too. We parameterically generate individual
Mj by randomly sampling wall, object, and initial agent
locations.
3. Experiments
3.1. Random agents
To demonstrate its essential workings, we tested the ToM-
net observer on a simple but illustrative toy problem. We
created a number of different species of random agents,
sampled agents from them, and generated behavioural
traces on a distribution of random 11× 11 gridworlds (e.g.
Fig 2a). Each agent had a stochastic policy defined by a
fixed vector of action probabilities pii(·) = pii. We defined
different species based on how sparse its agents’ policies
were: within a species S(α), each pii was drawn from a
Dirichlet distribution with concentration parameter α. At
one extreme, we created a species of agents with near-
deterministic policies by drawing pii ∼ Dir(α = 0.01);
here a single agent might overwhelmingly prefer to always
move left, and another to always move up. At the other ex-
treme, we created a species of agent with far more stochas-
tic policies, by drawing pii ∼ Dir(α = 3).
Next, we trained different ToMnet observers each on a
single species of agent. For each α, we formed a train-
ing set by sampling 1000 agents from S(α), and for
each agent, generating behavioural traces on randomly-
generated POMDPs. We then trained a ToMnet to observe
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Figure 3. ToMnet trained on random agents. (a) Likelihood of
agent’s true actions under the ToMnet’s predictions, given that
the ToMnet has been trained on species S(α). Priors are shown
in light blue, and posteriors after observing that agent perform
just that same action in Npast = 1 or 5 past episodes in darker
blue. Dots are data from the ToMnet; solid lines are from the ana-
lytic Bayes-optimal posteriors specialised to the respective S(α).
(b) Character embeddings echar ∈ R2 of different agents. Dots
are coloured by which action was observed to occur most during
Npast = 10 past episodes, and are darker the higher that count.
(c) Average KL-divergence between agents’ true and predicted
policies when the ToMnet is trained on agents from one species,
S(α), but tested on agents from a different species S(α′). Dots
show values from the ToMnet; lines show analytic expected KLs
when using analytic Bayes-optimal inference as in (a). Values cal-
culated for Npast = 1. The ToMnet thus learns an effective prior
for the species it is trained on. (d) Same, but including a ToMnet
trained on a mixture of species (with Npast = 5). The ToMnet
here implicitly learns to perform hierarchical inference.
how randomly-sampled agents Ai ∼ S(α) behave on a
variable number of past episodes (Npast ∼ U{0, 10}; for
simplicity, limiting the length of each past trajectory to a
single observation/action pair) and to use this information
to predict the initial action that each agentAi would take in
a new POMDP,Mk (e.g. Fig 2b-c). We omitted the mental
net for this task.
When the ToMnet observer is trained on a species S(α), it
learns how to approximate Bayes-optimal, online inference
about agents’ policies pii(·) = pii ∼ Dir(α). Fig 3a shows
how the ToMnet’s estimates of action probability increase
with the number of past observations of that action, and
how training the ToMnet on species with lower α makes it
apply priors that the policies are indeed sparser. We can
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also see how the ToMnet specialises to a given species
by testing it on agents from different species (Fig 3c):
the ToMnet makes better predictions about novel agents
drawn from the species which it was trained on. More-
over, the ToMnet easily learns how to predict behaviour
from mixtures of species (Fig 3d): when trained jointly on
species with highly deterministic (α = 0.01) and stochas-
tic (α = 3) policies, it implicitly learns to expect this bi-
modality in the policy distribution, and specialises its infer-
ence accordingly. We note that it is not learning about two
agents, but rather two species of agents, which each span a
spectrum of individual parameters.
There should be nothing surprising about seeing the ToM-
net learn to approximate Bayes-optimal online inference;
this should be expected given more general results about in-
ference and meta-learning with neural networks (MacKay,
1995; Finn & Levine, 2017). Our point here is that a very
first step in reasoning about other agents is an inference
problem. The ToMnet is just an engine for learning to do
inference and prediction on other agents.
The ToMnet does expose an agent embedding space which
we can explore. In Fig 3b, we show the values of echar
produced by a ToMnet with a 2D embedding space. We
note that the Bayes-optimal estimate of an agent’s policy
is a Dirichlet posterior, which depends only on α (which
is fixed for the species) and on the observed action count
(a 5-dim vector). We see a similar solution reflected in the
ToMnet’s echar embedding space, wherein agents are seg-
regated along canonical directions by their empirical action
counts.
In summary, without any changes to its architecture, a
ToMnet learns a general theory of mind that is specialised
for the distribution of agents it encounters in the world, and
estimates an agent-specific theory of mind online for each
individual agent that captures the sufficient statistics of its
behaviour.
3.2. Inferring goal-directed behaviour
An elementary component of humans’ theory of other
agents is an assumption that agents’ behaviour is goal-
directed. There is a wealth of evidence showing that this is
a core component of our model from early infancy (Gergely
et al., 1995; Woodward, 1998; 1999; Buresh & Woodward,
2007), and intelligent animals such as apes and corvids
have been shown to have similar expectations about their
conspecifics (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Ostojic´ et al., 2013).
Inferring the desires of others also takes a central role in
machine learning in imitation learning, most notably in in-
verse RL (Ng et al., 2000; Abbeel & Ng, 2004).
We demonstrate here how the ToMnet observer learns how
to infer the goals of reward-seeking agents. We defined
species of agents who acted within gridworlds with full ob-
servability (Fig 2a). Each gridworld was 11 × 11 in size,
had randomly-sampled walls, and contained four different
objects placed in random locations. Consuming an object
yielded a reward for the agent and caused the episode to
terminate. Each agent,Ai, had a unique, fixed reward func-
tion, such that it received reward ri,a ∈ (0, 1) when it con-
sumed object a; the vectors ri were sampled from a Dirich-
let distribution with concentration parameter α = 0.01.
Agents also received a negative reward of −0.01 for every
move taken, and a penalty of 0.05 for walking into walls.
In turn, the agents planned their behaviour through value
iteration, and hence had optimal policies pi∗i with respect to
their own reward functions.
We trained the ToMnet to observe behaviour of these agents
in randomly-sampled “past” MDPs, and to use this to pre-
dict the agents’ behaviour in a “current” MDP. We detail
three experiments below; these explore the range of capa-
bilities of the ToMnet in this domain.
First, we provided the ToMnet with a full trajectory of an
agent on a single past MDP (Fig 4a). In turn, we queried
the ToMnet with the initial state of a current MDP (Fig 4b)
and asked for a set of predictions: the next action the agent
would take (Fig 4c top), what object the agent would con-
sume by the end of the episode (Fig 4c bottom), and a set
of statistics about the agent’s trajectory in the current MDP,
the successor representation (SR; the expected discounted
state occupancy; Dayan, 1993, Fig 4). The ToMnet’s pre-
dictions qualitatively matched the agents’ true behaviours.
Second, as a more challenging task, we trained a ToMnet
to observe only partial trajectories of the agent’s past be-
haviour. We conditioned the ToMnet on single observation-
action pairs from a small number of past MDPs (Npast ∼
U{0, 10}; e.g. Fig 5a). As expected, increasing the num-
ber of past observations of an agent improved the ToMnet’s
ability to predict its behaviour on a new MDP (Fig 5b), but
even in the absence of any past observations, the ToMnet
had a strong prior for the reasonable behaviour that would
be expected of any agent within the species, such as move-
ment away from the corners, or consumption of the only
accessible object (Fig 5c).
We note that unlike the approach of inverse RL, the ToM-
net is not constrained to explicitly infer the agents’ re-
ward functions in service of its predictions. Nevertheless,
in this simple task, using a 2-dimensional character em-
bedding space renders this information immediately legi-
ble (Fig 5d). This is also true when the only behavioural
prediction is next-step action.
Finally, we added more diversity to the agent species by
applying a very high move cost (0.5) to 20% of the agents;
these agents therefore generally sought the closest object.
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past traj. current state
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0
1
pi
action
0
1
p
ro
b
.
consumption
successor
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4. ToMnet on goal-driven agents. (a) Past trajectory of
an example agent. Coloured squares indicate the four objects.
Red arrows indicate the position and action taken by the agent.
(b) Example query: a state from a new MDP. Black dot indicates
agent position. (c) ToMnet’s prediction for the agent’s next action
(top) and object consumed at the end of the episode (bottom) for
the query MDP in (b), given the past observation in (a). (d) ToM-
net’s prediction of the successor representation (SR) for query (b),
using discount γ = 0.9. Darker shading indicates higher expected
discounted state occupancy.
We trained a ToMnet to observe a small number of full tra-
jectories (Npast ∼ U{0, 5}) of randomly-selected agents
before making its behavioural prediction. The ToMnet
learned to infer from even a single trajectory which sub-
species of agent it was observing: if the agent went out of
its way to consume a distant object on a past episode, then
the ToMnet inferred a strong posterior that it would do so
in a new episode from any starting position (Fig 6a); if the
agent sought the closest object in a past episode, then the
ToMnet was more cautious about whether it would seek the
same object again on a new episode, deferring instead to a
prediction that the agent would act greedily again (Fig 6b).
This inference resembles the ability of children to jointly
reason about agents’ costs and rewards when observing
short traces of past behaviour (Jara-Ettinger et al., 2016;
Liu et al., 2017).
3.3. Learning to model deep RL agents
The previous experiments demonstrate the ToMnet’s ability
to learn models of simple, algorithmic agents which have
full observability. We next considered the ToMnet’s abil-
ity to learn models for a richer population of agents: those
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Figure 5. ToMnet on goal-driven agents, continued. (a) This
ToMnet sees only snapshots of single observation/action pairs
(red arrow) from a variable number of past episodes (one shown
here). (b) Increasing Npast leads to better predictions; here we
show the average posterior probability assigned to the true ac-
tion. Even when Npast = 0, the action probability is greater
than chance, since all agents in the species have similar policies
in some regions of the state space. (c) Predicted policy for differ-
ent initial agent locations in a query MDP, for different numbers
of past observations. Arrows show resultant vectors for the pre-
dicted policies, i.e.
∑
k ak · pˆi(ak|x, echar). When Npast = 0,
the ToMnet has no information about the agent’s preferred object,
so the predicted policy exhibits no net object preference. When
Npast > 0, the ToMnet infers a preference for the pink object.
When the agent is stuck in the top right chamber, the ToMnet pre-
dicts that it will always consume the blue object, as this terminates
the episode as soon as possible, avoiding a costly penalty. (d) 2D
embedding space of the ToMnet, showing values of echar from
100 different agents. Agents are colour-coded by their ground-
truth preferred objects; saturation increases with Npast, with the
grey dots in the centre denoting agents with Npast = 0.
with partial observability and neural network-based poli-
cies, trained using deep reinforcement learning. In this sec-
tion we show how the ToMnet learns how to do inference
over the kind of deep RL agent it is observing, and show
the specialised predictions it makes as a consequence.
This domain begins to capture the complexity of reason-
ing about real-world agents. So long as the deep RL agents
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Figure 6. ToMnet on greedy agents. Left: a single past trajec-
tory. Right: ToMnet predictions on a query MDP. Light shaded
regions indicate ToMnet’s prediction for the most probable object
the agent will consume by the end of the episode, given that the
agent is currently in that location. (a) After seeing the agent take
a long path to the orange object, the ToMnet predicts it will try to
consume the orange object on the query MDP, no matter its cur-
rent location. (b) After seeing the agent take the shortest path to
the green object, the ToMnet predicts it will generally consume a
nearby object on the query MDP.
share some overlap in their tasks, structure, and learning al-
gorithms, we expect that they should exhibit at least some
shared behavioural patterns. These patterns should also
diverge systematically from each other as the aforemen-
tioned factors vary, and individual agents may also exhibit
idiosyncratic behaviour as they settle in local minima while
optimising their respective policies. There are thus oppor-
tunities to learn rich general and agent-specific theories of
mind for such populations. Moreover, as the tasks and
networks become more complex, hand-crafting a Machine
Theory of Mind to parse behaviour based on our human
knowledge (e.g. Baker et al., 2011; Nakahashi et al., 2016;
Baker et al., 2017; Lake et al., 2017) becomes increasingly
intractable; instead we seek here a path towards machines
which learn how to model others’ minds autonomously
(Botvinick et al., 2017).
We trained three different species of agents on a modified
version of the gridworlds, described below in Section 3.4.
In brief, agents received maximum reward for reaching a
subgoal location first, then consuming a preferred object
that differed from agent to agent. Consuming any of the
non-subgoal objects terminated the episode. All agents
were based on the UNREAL architecture (Jaderberg et al.,
2017), with details given in Appendix D. One species of
agent (“blind”) was unable to observe the maze state at all,
and could only observe its previous action (at−1) and re-
ward (rt−1), which it could integrate over time through its
LSTM state. The second species had partial observability
(“sighted”), but was stateless: these agents could observe
the gridworld within a 5 × 5 window centred at their cur-
rent location, with the rest of the maze shrouded by a binary
mask; the agents’ policies however were purely reactive,
implemented via feedforward networks without any mem-
ory. The third species shared the benefits of the other two,
being both sighted (with partial observability) and stateful
actions consumptions successors
-0.6
0
∆
 l
o
ss
with char net
with mental net
with both
current
state
SR:
blind
SR:
sighted, stateless
SR:
sighted, stateful
(a)
(b)
Figure 7. Using the ToMnet to characterise trained neural-net
agents. (a) Usefulness of ToMnet components for the three be-
havioural prediction targets, compared with a simple ToMnet with
no character nor mental net. Longer bars are better; including
both character and mental nets is best. More details are given
in Table A1. (b) A ToMnet’s prediction of agents’ future state
occupancy given a query POMDP state at time t = 0 (left), as
per Fig 4d. Star denotes the subgoal. The maps on the right are
produced after observing behaviour on Npast = 5 past POMDPs
from a sampled agent of each subspecies (always preferring the
pink object). The ToMnet does not know a priori which sub-
species each agent belongs to, but infers it from past behaviour.
(with an LSTM-based policy).
The ToMnet, on the other hand, observed the behaviour of
these agents with full observability of the POMDP state.
We constructed a training set for the ToMnet by generat-
ing behaviour from 120 trained agents (3 species × 4 pre-
ferred objects × 10 neural nets trained with different ran-
dom seeds). We held out a test set of a further 120 trained
agents (i.e. trained using 10 additional random seeds) for
evaluating the trained ToMnet. All results below are shown
for the test set, i.e. predicting behaviour for novel agents
which the ToMnet had never seen before.
Unlike previous experiments, these agents’ behaviour de-
pended on both their individual characteristics and their
state; the ToMnet thus needed both a character net and a
mental net to make the best predictions (Fig 7a).
Qualitative evaluations of the ToMnet’s predictions show
how it learned the expected behaviour of the three species
of agents. Fig 7b shows the ToMnet’s predictions of future
state occupancy for the same query state, but given differ-
ent past observations of how the agent behaves. Without
being given the species label, the ToMnet implicitly infers
it, and maps out where the agent will go next: blind agents
continue until they hit a wall, then turn; sighted but stateless
agents consume objects opportunistically; sighted, stateful
agents explore the interior and seek out the subgoal. Thus
the ToMnet develops general models for the three different
species of agents in its world.
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Figure 8. Variational character embeddings produced from
observations of held-out agents. This shows how the ToMnet
learns a disentangled conceptual space of agent personalities. Left
panel shows the first two of four non-degenerate dimensions of
echar ∈ R8; right panels show the second two. Ellipses denote the
Gaussian covariance (one stdev) of the posteriors q(echar|·). Left:
posteriors coloured by agents’ ground-truth species. Right: pos-
teriors coloured by agents’ ground-truth preferred objects. The
ToMnet uses the first two dimensions of echar (left panel) to rep-
resent which of the three species the agent belongs to, and the
next two dimensions (right panels) to represent its preferred ob-
ject. When the agent is blind, the ToMnet represents the agent’s
preferred object by the prior, a unit Gaussian. All posteriors col-
lapsed to the prior in the remaining four dimensions.
While we wished to visualise the agent embeddings as in
previous experiments, constraining echar to a 2D space pro-
duced poor training performance. With the higher dimen-
sionality required to train the ToMnet on this task (e.g. us-
ing R8), we found it difficult to discern any structure in
the embedding space. This was likely due to the relatively
deep prediction network, and the lack of explicit pressure to
compress or disentangle the embeddings. However, the re-
sults were dramatically different when we added an explicit
bottleneck to this layer, using the Deep Variational Infor-
mation Bottleneck technique recently developed in Alemi
et al. (2016). By replacing the character embedding vec-
tors echar with simple Gaussian posteriors, q(echar|·), limit-
ing their information content by regularising them towards
a unit Gaussian prior, p(echar), and annealing the respec-
tive penalty, Lq = β DKL(q||p) from β = 0 to β = 0.01
over training, the ToMnet was driven to disentangle the fac-
tors of variation in agent personality space (Fig 8). More-
over, the ToMnet even discovered substructure amongst the
sighted/stateless subspecies that we were not aware of, as
it clustered sighted/stateless test agents into two subcate-
gories (Fig 9a-b). By contrasting the ToMnet’s predictions
for these two clusters, the structure it discovers becomes
obvious: each sighted/stateless agent explores its world us-
ing one of two classic memoryless wall-following algo-
rithms, the right-hand rule or the left-hand rule (Fig 9c).
3.4. Acting based on false beliefs
It has long been argued that a core part of human The-
ory of Mind is that we recognise that other agents do not
base their decisions directly on the state of the world, but
rather on an internal representation of the state of the world
(Leslie, 1987; Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Wellman, 1992;
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Figure 9. The ToMnet discovers two subspecies of sighted/
stateless agents. (a) Variational character posteriors, q(echar),
for sighted/stateless agents. Axes show the first two non-
degenerate dimensions of echar (as in Fig 8a). Each colour shows
the posteriors inferred from a single deep RL agent from the test
set, using different behavioural traces. (b) Marginal posteriors for
the individual agents shown in (a). These are shown as iso-density
contours, enclosing 80% of the total density. Dots show the clus-
ter means. (c) Predicted policy differences between agents in the
two clusters. Each row shows a different query POMDP. Each
panel shows predicted policy for different agent locations, as in
Fig 5c. Left: ToMnet’s prediction for an agent with echar at the
one cluster mean. Middle: at the other cluster mean. Arrows are
darker where the two policies differ (higher DJS). Right: vec-
tor difference between left and middle. Agents in the first cluster
explore in an anti-clockwise direction, while agents in the second
cluster explore in a clockwise direction.
Baillargeon et al., 2016). This is usually framed as an un-
derstanding that other agents hold beliefs about the world:
they may have knowledge that we do not; they may be ig-
norant of something that we know; and, most dramatically,
they may believe the world to be one way, when we in fact
know this to be mistaken. An understanding of this last
possibility – that others can have false beliefs – has become
the most celebrated indicator of a rich Theory of Mind, and
there has been considerable research into how much chil-
dren, infants, apes, and other species carry this capability
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Southgate et al., 2007; Clayton
et al., 2007; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Krupenye et al., 2016;
Baillargeon et al., 2016).
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Figure 10. Subgoal task, where agents can have false beliefs.
(a) Trajectory of an agent (red arrows) as it seeks the subgoal
(star). Agent has partial observability: dark grey areas have not
been observed; light grey areas have been seen previously, but are
not observable at the time of subgoal consumption. (b) When the
agent consumes the subgoal object, there is a small probability
that the other objects will instantaneously swap locations. Left:
swap event within the agent’s current field of view. Right: outside
it. (c) Effect of swap on agent’s immediate policy. (d) Effect
of swap on agent’s empirical successor representation (average
discounted state occupancy over 200 stochastic rollouts). Agent
prefers the blue object.
Here, we sought to explore whether the ToMnet would also
learn that agents may hold false beliefs about the world.
To do so, we first needed to generate a set of POMDPs
in which agents could indeed hold incorrect information
about the world (and act upon this). To create these condi-
tions, we allowed the state of the environment to undergo
random changes, sometimes where the agents couldn’t see
them. In the subgoal maze described above in Section 3.3,
we included a low probability (p = 0.1) state transition
when the agent stepped on the subgoal, such that the four
other objects would randomly permute their locations in-
stantaneously (Fig 10a-b). These swap events were only
visible to the agent insofar as the objects’ positions were
within the agent’s current field of view; when the swaps oc-
curred entirely outside its field of view, the agent’s internal
state and policy at the next time step remained unaffected
(policy changes shown in Fig 10c, right side), a signature of
a false belief. As agents were trained to expect these low-
probability swap events, they learned to produce corrective
behaviour as their policy was rolled out over time (Fig 10d,
right side). While the trained agents were competent at the
task, they were not optimal.
In turn, we trained the ToMnet to predict the behaviour of
these agents. We initially focused on agents with 5 × 5
fields of view, as in Section 3.3. We trained the ToMnet on
rollouts from 40 sighted/stateful agents, each having a pref-
erence for one of the four different objects; we tested it on
a set of 40 held-out agents. We used the ToMnet model de-
scribed above in Section 3.3, with Npast = 4 past episodes
for character inference.
Our goal was to determine whether the ToMnet would
learn a general theory of mind that included an element of
false beliefs. However, the ToMnet, as described, does not
have the capacity to explicitly report agents’ (latent) be-
lief states, only the ability to report predictions about the
agents’ overt behaviour. To proceed, we took inspiration
from the literature on human infant and ape Theory of Mind
(Call & Tomasello, 2008; Baillargeon et al., 2016). Here,
experimenters have often utilised variants of the classic
“Sally-Anne test” (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen
et al., 1985) to probe subjects’ models of others. In the clas-
sic test, the observer watches an agent leave a desired ob-
ject in one location, only for it to be moved, unseen by the
agent. The subject, who sees all, is asked where the agent
now believes the object lies. While infants and apes have
limited ability to explicitly report such inferences about
others’ mental states, experimenters have nevertheless been
able to measure these subjects’ predictions of where the
agents will actually go, e.g. by measuring anticipatory eye
movements, or surprise when agents behave in violation of
subjects’ expectations (Call & Tomasello, 2008; Krupenye
et al., 2016; Baillargeon et al., 2016). These experiments
have demonstrated that human infants and apes can implic-
itly model others as holding false beliefs.
We used the swap events to construct a gridworld Sally-
Anne test. We hand-crafted scenarios where an agent
would see its preferred blue object in one location, but
would have to move away from it to reach a subgoal be-
fore returning to consume it (Fig 11a). During this time,
the preferred object might be moved by a swap event, and
the agent may or may not see this occur, depending on how
far away the subgoal was. We forced the agents along this
trajectory (off-policy), and measured how a swap event af-
fected the agent’s probability of moving back to the pre-
ferred object. As expected, when the swap occurred within
the agent’s field of view, the agent’s likelihood of turning
back dropped dramatically; when the swap occurred out-
side its field of view, the policy was unchanged (Fig 11b,
left).
In turn, we presented these demonstration trajectories to
the ToMnet (which had seen past behaviour indicating the
agent’s preferred object). Crucially, the ToMnet was able
to observe the entire POMDP state, and thus was aware
of swaps when the agent was not. To perform this task
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Figure 11. Sally-Anne test. (a) We force agents to initially move
along a hand-constructed trajectory. Agents have 5 × 5 observ-
ability and prefer the blue square object, but must seek the sub-
goal (star) first. When an agent reaches the subgoal, a swap
event may or may not occur. If there is no swap, the optimal
action is to go left. By extending the length of the path, the
swap event will no longer be visible to the agent. (b) Left: ef-
fect of a swap event on the agents’ true policies, measured as
the relative reduction in their probability of moving back towards
the original location where they saw the blue object (∆piL =
(pi(aL|no swap)− pi(aL|swap))/pi(aL|no swap) × 100%). If
the agent can see that the object has moved from this location
(swap dist ≤ 2), it will not return left. If it cannot see this loca-
tion, its policy will not change. Right: ToMnet’s prediction.
properly, the ToMnet needs to have implicitly learned to
separate out what it itself knows, and what the agent can
plausibly know, without relying on a hand-engineered, ex-
plicit observation model for the agent. Indeed, the ToM-
net predicted the correct behavioural patterns (Fig 11b,
right): specifically, the ToMnet predicts that when the
world changes far away from an agent, that agent will per-
sist with a policy that is founded on false beliefs about the
world.
This test was a hand-crafted scenario. We validated its re-
sults by looking at the ToMnet’s predictions for how the
agents responded to all swap events in the distribution of
POMDPs. We sampled a set of test mazes, and rolled out
the agents’ policies until they consumed the subgoal, se-
lecting only episodes where the agents had seen their pre-
ferred object along the way. At this point, we created a
set of counterfactuals: either a swap event occurred, or it
didn’t.
We measured the ground truth for how the swaps would
affect the agent’s policy, via the average Jensen-Shannon
divergence (DJS) between the agent’s true action probabil-
ities in the no-swap and swap conditions1. As before, the
agent’s policy often changed when a swap was in view (for
1For a discussion of why we used the DJS measure, see Ap-
pendix F.2.
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Figure 12. Natural Sally-Anne test, using swap events within
the distribution of POMDPs. (a) Left: effect of swap events on
5 × 5 agents’ next-step policies. Right: ToMnet predictions. (b)
For SRs of different discount factors (γ). DJS measured between
normalised SRs. (c)-(d) As for (a)-(b), but for a ToMnet trained
on a range of agents with different fields of view. Showing only
3 × 3 and 9 × 9 results for clarity. For a discussion of why 3 ×
3 agents’ next-step actions are particularly sensitive to adjacent
swap events, see Appendix F.1.
these agents, within a 2 block radius), but wouldn’t change
when the swap was not observable (Fig 12a, left).
The ToMnet learned that the agents’ policies were indeed
more sensitive to local changes in the POMDP state, but
were relatively invariant to changes that occurred out of
sight (Fig 12a, right). The ToMnet did not, however, learn
a hard observability boundary, and was more liberal in pre-
dicting that far-off changes could affect agent policy. The
ToMnet also correctly predicted that the swaps would in-
duce corrective behaviour over longer time periods, even
when they were not initially visible (Fig 12b).
These patterns were even more pronounced when we
trained the ToMnet on mixed populations of agents with
different fields of view. In this task, the ToMnet had to infer
what each agent could see (from past behaviour alone) in
order to predict each agent’s behaviour in the future. The
ToMnet’s predictions reveal an implicit grasp of how dif-
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ferent agents’ sensory abilities render them differentially
vulnerable to acquire false beliefs (Fig 12c-d).
Most surprising of all, we found that the ToMnet learned
these statistics even if the ToMnet had never seen swap
events during training: the curves in Fig 12 were qual-
itatively identical for the ToMnet under such conditions
(Fig A1).
On the one hand, we were impressed that the ToMnet learns
a general theory of mind that incorporates an implicit un-
derstanding that agents act based on their own persistent
representations of the world, even if they are mistaken. On
the other hand, we should not attribute this cognitive ability
to a special feature of the ToMnet architecture itself, which
is indeed very straightforward. Rather, this work demon-
strates that representational Theory of Mind can arise sim-
ply by observing competent agents acting in POMDPs.
3.5. Explicitly inferring belief states
We have demonstrated that the ToMnet learns that agents
can act based on false beliefs. This is limited, though, in
that the ToMnet cannot explicitly report what these agents
know and don’t know about the world. Moreover, it is dif-
ficult to extract any beliefs that will not manifest immedi-
ately in overt behaviour.
We therefore extended the ToMnet to be able to make
declarative statements about agents’ beliefs. We achieved
this by constructing a supervised dataset of belief states in
the sample gridworld. We trained the UNREAL agents to
report their beliefs about the locations of the four objects
and the subgoal at every time step, alongside their policy.
To do this, we added a head to the LSTM that output a
posterior over each object’s current location on the grid (or
whether it was absent). During training, the agents learned
to report their best estimate of each object’s current loca-
tion, based on its observations so far during the episode.
Example belief states for the query MDP states in Fig 10a-
b are shown in Fig 13a. Note that these reported beliefs
are not causal to the agents’ policy; they are just a readout
from the same LSTM hidden state that serves the policy.
In turn, we trained a single ToMnet on agents with a range
of different fields of view. This ToMnet had to observe
only agents’ overt behaviour, and use it to predict, for a
given query state, an agent’s policy, consumptions, suc-
cessor representations, and reported beliefs (i.e., what the
agent would say about the world if it were asked; e.g.
Fig 13b).
As shown in Fig 13c, the ToMnet learns agent-specific the-
ories of mind for the different subspecies that grasp the
essential differences between their belief-forming tenden-
cies: agents with less visibility of changes in their world
are more likely to report false beliefs; and behave accord-
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Figure 13. Supervised prediction of beliefs. (a) Belief states
(b = p(obj location|x0:tswap)) reported by the agent in the
POMDPs shown in Fig 10 at the time of subgoal consumptions.
Here we show b for only two objects (rows). In the left two
columns, the swap event occurred within the agent’s field of view,
so the agent’s beliefs about the object locations changed given a
swap. In the right two columns, the swap event was not within
the agent’s field of view, so its beliefs about the object locations
did not change. (b) Predictions bˆ made by the ToMnet, given
only the trajectory of states and actions. The ToMnet predicts that
the observable swap event (left) leads to a change in belief state,
whereas the unobservable swap event (right) does not. (c) Statis-
tics, as in Fig 12, but for beliefs. The ToMnet captures the longer
range over which the 9×9 agents can update their beliefs (though
again, it infers a soft observability boundary).
ing to them too (as in Fig 13c).
Last of all, we included an additional variational informa-
tion bottleneck penalty, to encourage low-dimensional ab-
stract embeddings of agent types. As with the agent char-
acterisation in Fig 7, the character embeddings of these
agents separated along the factors of variation (field of view
and preferred object; Fig 14). Moreover, these embeddings
show the ToMnet’s ability to distinguish different agents’
visibility: blind and 3×3 agents are easily distinguishable,
whereas there is little in past behaviour to separate 7 × 7
agents from 9 × 9 agents (or little benefit in making this
distinction).
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Figure 14. Variational character embeddings of agents with
different fields of view. (a) First two dimensions of echar rep-
resent field of view. Contours are shown of the marginal poste-
riors for each agent species. (b) Next three dimensions represent
preferred objects. Volumes show the approximate marginal pos-
teriors for agents preferring each of the four objects (colours).
Blind agents (left) cannot express their preference through their
overt behaviour; the ToMnet therefore reverts to the prior. Sighted
agents (right) produce embeddings arranged in a roughly tetrahe-
dral arrangement. This same arrangement arises independently of
the sighted agents’ field of view.
We note that this particular construction of explicit belief
inference will likely not scale in its current form. Our
method depends on two assumptions that break down in
the real world. First, it requires access to others’ latent be-
lief states for supervision. We assume here that the ToMnet
gets access to these via a rich communication channel; as
humans, this channel is likely much sparser. It is an em-
pirical question as to whether the real-world information
stream is sufficient to train such an inference network. We
do, however, have privileged access to some of our own
mental states through meta-cognition; though this data may
be biased and noisy, it might be sufficiently rich to learn this
task. Second, it is intractable to predict others’ belief states
about every aspect of the world. As humans, we neverthe-
less have the capacity to make such predictions about arbi-
trary variables as the need arises. This may require creative
solutions in future work, such as forming abstract embed-
dings of others’ belief states that can be queried.
4. Discussion
In this paper, we used meta-learning to build a system that
learns how to model other agents. We have shown, through
a sequence of experiments, how this ToMnet learns a gen-
eral model for agents in the training distribution, as well
as how to construct an agent-specific model online while
observing a new agent’s behaviour. The ToMnet can flex-
ibly learn such models over a range of different species of
agents, whilst making few assumptions about the genera-
tive processes driving these agents’ decision making. The
ToMnet can also discover abstractions within the space of
behaviours.
We note that the experiments we pursued here were simple,
and designed to illustrate the core ideas and capabilities of
such a system. There is much work to do to scale the ToM-
net to richer domains.
First, we have worked entirely within gridworlds, due to the
control such environments afford. We look forward to ex-
tending these systems to operate within complex 3D visual
environments, and within other POMDPs with rich state
spaces.
Second, we did not experiment here with limiting the ob-
servability of the observer itself. This is clearly an im-
portant challenge within real-world social interaction, e.g.
when we try to determine what someone else knows that we
do not. This is, at its heart, an inference problem (Baker
et al., 2017); learning to do this robustly is a future chal-
lenge for the ToMnet.
Third, there are many other dimensions over which we may
wish to characterise agents, such as whether they are ani-
mate or inanimate (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000), prosocial
or adversarial (Ullman et al., 2009), reactive or able to plan
(Sutton & Barto, 1998). Potentially more interesting is the
possibility of using the ToMnet to discover new structure
in the behaviour of either natural or artificial populations,
i.e. as a kind of machine anthropology.
Fourth, a Theory of Mind is important for social beings as
it informs our social decision-making. An important step
forward for this research is to situate the ToMnet inside ar-
tificial agents, who must learn to perform multi-agent tasks.
In pursuing all these directions we anticipate many future
needs: to enrich the set of predictions a ToMnet must make;
to introduce gentle inductive biases to the ToMnet’s gen-
erative models of agents’ behaviour; and to consider how
agents might draw from their own experience and cogni-
tion in order to inform their models of others. Addressing
these will be necessary for advancing a Machine Theory of
Mind that learns the rich capabilities of responsible social
beings.
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Appendices
A. Model description: architectures
Here we describe the precise details of the architectures
used in the main text.
We note that we did not optimise our results by tweaking
architectures or hyperparameters in any systematic or sub-
stantial way. Rather, we simply picked sensible-looking
values. We anticipate that better performance could be ob-
tained by improving these decisions, but this is beyond the
scope of this work.
A.1. Common elements.
Pre-processing. Both the character net and the mental state
net consume trajectories, which are sequences of observed
state/action pairs, τ (obs)ij = {(x(obs)t , a(obs)t )}Tt=0, where i
is the agent index, and j is the episode index. The ob-
served states in our experiments, x(obs)t , are always ten-
sors of shape (11 × 11 × K), where K is the number of
feature planes (comprising one feature plane for the walls,
one for each object, and one for the agent). The observed
actions, a(obs)t , are always vectors of length 5. We com-
bine these data through a spatialisation-concatenation op-
eration, whereby the actions are tiled over space into a
(11 × 11 × 5) tensor, and concatenated with the states to
form a single tensor of shape (11× 11× (K + 5)).
Training. All ToMnets were trained with the Adam opti-
miser, with learning rate 10−4, using batches of size 16. We
trained the ToMnet for 40k minibatches for random agents
(Section 3.1), and for 2M minibatches otherwise.
A.2. ToMnet for random agents (Section 3.1)
Data. For each species, S(α), we trained a single ToM-
net. For each agent, the ToMnet was provided with a vari-
able number of past episodes (Npast ∼ U{0, 10}), each
of length 1 (i.e. each trajectory consisting of a single state-
action pair). When no past episodes were sampled for a
given agent, the character embedding was set to echar = 0.
Character net. Each trajectory τij comprises a single
state/action pair. We spatialise the action, and concate-
nate this with the state. This is passed into a 1-layer con-
vnet, with 8 feature planes and ReLU nonlinearity. We then
passed the sequence of these (indexed by j) into a convo-
lutional LSTM, with the output passed through an average
pooling layer, and a fully-connected layer to a 2D embed-
ding space, to produce echar,i. We obtained similar results
with a wide range of different architectures.
Mental net. None.
Prediction net. In this experiment, we predict only next-
step action (i.e. policy, pˆi) We spatialise echar,i, and con-
catenate with the query state. This is passed to a 2-layer
convnet, with 32 feature planes and ReLUs. This is fol-
lowed by average pooling, then a fully-connected layer to
logits in R5, followed by a softmax.
A.3. ToMnet for inferring goals (Section 3.2)
A.3.1. EXPERIMENT 1: SINGLE PAST MDP
Data. Character embedding formed from a single past
episode, comprising a full trajectory on a single MDP.
Query state is the initial state of a new MDP, so no men-
tal state embedding required.
Character net. For the single trajectory τi in the past
episode, the ToMnet forms the character embedding echar,i
as follows. We pre-process the data from each time-step by
spatialising the actions, a(obs)t , concatenating these with the
respective states, x(obs)t , passing through a 5-layer resnet,
with 32 channels, ReLU nonlinearities, and batch-norm,
followed by average pooling. We pass the results through
an LSTM with 64 channels, with a linear output to either a
2-dim or 8-dim echar,i (no substantial difference in results).
Mental net. None.
Prediction net. In this and subsequent experiments, we
make three predictions: next-step action, which objects are
consumed by the end of the episode, and successor rep-
resentations. We use a shared torso for these predictions,
from which separate heads branch off. For the prediction
torso, we spatialise echar,i, and concatenate with the query
state; this is passed into a 5-layer resnet, with 32 channels,
ReLU nonlinearities, and batch-norm.
Action prediction head. From the torso output: a 1-layer
convnet with 32 channels and ReLUs, followed by average
pooling, and a fully-connected layer to 5-dim logits, fol-
lowed by a softmax. This gives the predicted policy, pˆi.
Consumption prediction head. From the torso output: a
1-layer convnet with 32 channels and ReLUs, followed by
average pooling, and a fully-connected layer to 4-dims, fol-
lowed by a sigmoid. This gives the respective Bernoulli
probabilities that each of the four objects will be consumed
by the end of the episode, cˆ.
Successor representation prediction head. From the
torso output: a 1-layer convnet with 32 channels and Re-
LUs, then a 1-layer convnet with 3 channels, followed by a
softmax over each channel independently. This gives the
predicted normalised SRs for the three discount factors,
γ = 0.5, 0.9, 0.99.
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A.3.2. EXPERIMENT 2: MANY PAST MDPS, ONLY A
SINGLE SNAPSHOT EACH
Data. Character embedding is formed from many past
episodes (Npast ∼ U{0, 10}); however, we only use a
snapshot of a single time point (i.e. a single state/action
pair) from each past episode. Query state as for Experi-
ment 1.
Character net. For each trajectory τij , the character net
adds a contribution echar,ij to the character embedding
echar,i as follows. We pre-process the single state/action
pair in τij as in Experiment 1, i.e. spatialising, concatenat-
ing, resnet, average pooling. There is no LSTM as there
is only a single state/action pair; instead we use a fully-
connected layer to form echar,ij ∈ R2. These are summed
across the Npast past trajectories to form echar,i.
Mental net. None.
Prediction net. As for Experiment 1.
A.3.3. EXPERIMENT 3: GREEDY AGENTS
Same as Experiment 1, but with Npast ∈ U{0, 5}.
A.4. ToMnet for modelling deep RL agents
(Section 3.3)
Data. Character embedding is formed from observing full
trajectories of agents on Npast = 4 POMDPs. While the
agents have partial observability, potentially with signifi-
cant parts of the state masked, the observer sees the entire
gridworld (albeit without any indication of the field of view
of the agent). The current episode is split at a random time
(drawn uniformly from U{0, T − 1} where T is the length
of the trajectory). The trajectory prior to the split forms the
“recent trajectory”, and is passed to the mental net. The
state at the time of the split is used as the query state.
Character net. For each past trajectory τij , the charac-
ter net adds a contribution echar,ij to the character embed-
ding echar,i via the same architecture as in Experiment 1
described in Appendix A.3 above, with an 8-dim echar,ij .
These are summed to form echar,i.
Mental net. We pre-process each time step’s state/action
pair in the recent trajectory as follows: we spatialise the
action, concatenate with the state, pass through a 5-layer
resnet, with 32 channels, ReLU nonlinearities, and batch-
norm. The results are fed into a convolutional LSTM
with 32 channels. The LSTM output is also a 1-layer
convnet with 32 channels, yielding a mental state embed-
ding emental,i ∈ R11×11×32. When the recent trajectory
is empty (i.e. the query state is the initial state of the
POMDP), emental,i is the zero vector.
Prediction net. As in Experiment 1 described in Ap-
pendix A.3. However, the prediction torso begins by spa-
tialising echar,i and concatenating it with both emental,i and
the query state. Also, as these agents act in gridworlds
that include the subgoal object, the consumption prediction
head outputs a 5-dim vector.
DVIB. For the Deep Variational Information Bottleneck
experiments, we altered the architecture by making the
character net output a posterior density, q(echar,i), rather
than a single latent echar,i; likewise, for the mental net
to produce q(emental,i), rather than emental,i. We parame-
terised both densities as Gaussians, with the respective nets
outputting the mean and log diagonal of the covariance ma-
trices, as in Kingma & Welling (2013). For the character
net, we achieved this by doubling the dimensionality of the
final fully-connected layer; for the mental net, we doubled
the number of channels in the final convolutional layer. In
both cases, we used fixed, isotropic Gaussian priors. For
evaluating predictive performance after the bottleneck, we
sampled both echar and emental, propagating gradients back
using the reparameterisation trick. For evaluating the bot-
tleneck cost, we used the analytic KL for q(echar,i), and
the analytic KL for q(emental,i) conditioned on the sam-
pled value of echar,i. We scaled the bottleneck costs by
βchar = βmental = β, annealing β quadratically from 0 to
0.01 over 500k steps.
A.5. ToMnet for false beliefs (Sections 3.4–3.5)
The ToMnet architecture was the same as described above
in Appendix A.4. The experiments in Section 3.5 also in-
cluded an additional belief prediction head to the prediction
net.
Belief prediction head. For each object, this head outputs
a 122-dim discrete distribution (the predicted belief that the
object is in each of the 11 × 11 locations on the map, or
whether the agent believes the object is absent altogether).
From the torso output: a 1-layer convnet with 32 channels
and ReLU, branching to (a) another 1-layer convnet with
5 channels for the logits for the predicted beliefs that each
object is at the 11×11 locations on the map, as well as to (b)
a fully-connected layer to 5-dims for the predicted beliefs
that each object is absent. We unspatialise and concatenate
the outputs of (a) and (b) in each of the 5 channels, and
apply a softmax to each channel.
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B. Loss function
Here we describe the components of the loss function used
for training the ToMnet.
For each agent,Ai, we sample past and current trajectories,
and form predictions for the query POMDP at time t. Each
prediction provides a contribution to the loss, described be-
low. We average the respective losses across each of the
agents in the minibatch, and give equal weighting to each
loss component.
Action prediction. The negative log-likelihood of the true
action taken by the agent under the predicted policy:
Laction,i = − log pˆi(a(obs)t |x(obs)t , echar,i, emental,i)
Consumption prediction. For each object, k, the negative
log-likelihood that the object is/isn’t consumed:
Lconsumption,i =
∑
k
− log pck(ck|x(obs)t , echar,i, emental,i)
Successor representation prediction. For each discount
factor, γ, we define the agent’s empirical successor repre-
sentation as the normalised, discounted rollout from time t
onwards, i.e.:
SRγ(s) =
1
Z
T−t∑
∆t=0
γ∆tI(st+∆t = s)
where Z is the normalisation constant such that∑
s SRγ(s) = 1. The loss here is then the cross-entropy
between the predicted successor representation and the em-
pirical one:
LSR,i =
∑
γ
∑
s
−SRγ(s) log ŜRγ(s)
Belief prediction. The agent’s belief states for each ob-
ject k is a discrete distribution over 122 dims (the 11 × 11
locations on the map, plus an additional dimension for an
absent object), denoted bk(s). For each object, k, the loss
is the cross-entropy between the ToMnet’s predicted belief
state and the agent’s true belief state:
Lbelief,i =
∑
k
∑
s
−bk(s) log bˆk(s)
Deep Varational Information Bottleneck. In addition to
these loss components, where DVIB was used, we included
an additional term for the β-weighted KLs between poste-
riors and the priors
LDV IB = βDKL (q(echar,i)||p(echar)) +
βDKL (q(emental,i)||p(emental))
C. Gridworld details
The POMDPs Mj were all 11 × 11 gridworld mazes.
Mazes in Sections 3.1–3.2 were sampled with between 0
and 4 random walls; mazes in Sections 3.3–3.5 were sam-
pled with between 0 and 6 random walls. Walls were de-
fined between two randomly-sampled endpoints, and could
be diagonal.
Each Mj contained four terminal objects. These objects
could be consumed by the agent walking on top of them.
Consuming these objects ended an episode. If no terminal
object was consumed after 31 steps (random and algorith-
mic agents; Sections 3.1–3.2) or 51 steps (deep RL agents;
Sections 3.3–3.5), the episodes terminated automatically as
a time-out. The sampled walls may trap the agent, and
make it impossible for the agent to terminate the episode
without timing out.
Deep RL agents (Sections 3.3–3.5) acted in gridworlds that
contained an additional subgoal object. Consuming the
subgoal did not terminate the episode.
Reward functions for the agents were as follows:
Random agents (Section 3.1.) No reward function.
Algorithmic agents (Section 3.2). For a given agent, the
reward function over the four terminal objects was drawn
randomly from a Dirichlet with concentration parameter
0.01. Each agent thus has a sparse preference for one ob-
ject. Penalty for each move: 0.01. Penalty for walking into
a wall: 0.05. Greedy agents’ penalty for each move: 0.5.
These agents planned their trajectories using value itera-
tion, with a discount factor of 1. When multiple moves of
equal value were available, these agents sampled from their
best moves stochastically.
Deep RL agents (Sections 3.3–3.5). Penalty for each
move: 0.005. Penalty for walking into a wall: 0.05. Penalty
for ending an episode without consuming a terminal object:
1.
For each deep RL agent species (e.g. blind, stateless, 5×5,
...), we trained a number of canonical agents which re-
ceived a reward of 1 for consuming the subgoal, and a re-
ward of 1 for consuming a single preferred terminal object
(e.g. the blue one). Consuming any other object yielded
zero reward (though did terminate the episode). We ar-
tifically enlarged this population of trained agents by a
factor of four, by inserting permutations into their obser-
vation functions, ωi, that effectively permuted the object
channels. For example, when we took a trained blue-
object-preferring agent, and inserted a transformation that
swapped the third object channel with the first object chan-
nel, this agent behaved as a pink-object-preferring agent.
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D. Deep RL agent training and architecture
Deep RL agents were based on the UNREAL architec-
ture (Jaderberg et al., 2017). These were trained with over
100M episode steps, using 16 CPU workers. We used the
Adam optimiser with a learning rate of 10−5, and BPTT,
unrolling over the whole episode (50 steps). Policies were
regularised with an entropy cost of 0.005 to encourage ex-
ploration.
We trained a total of 660 agents, spanning 33 random
seeds × 5 fields of view × 2 architectures (feedfor-
ward/convolutional LSTM) × 2 depths (4 layer convnet or
2 layer convnet, both with 64 channels). We selected the
top 20 agents per condition (out of 33 random seeds), by
their average return. We randomly partitioned these sets
into 10 training and 10 test agents per condition. With the
reward permutations described above in Appendix C, this
produced 40 training and 40 test agents per condition.
Observations. Agents received an observation at each time
step of nine 11 × 11 feature planes – indicating, at each
location, whether a square was empty, a wall, one of the
five total objects, the agent, or currently unobservable.
Beliefs. We also trained agents with the auxiliary task of
predicting the current locations of all objects in the map.
To do this, we included an additional head to the Convo-
lutional LSTMs, in addition to the policy (pit) and baseline
(Vt) heads. This head output a posterior for each object’s
location in the world, bk (i.e. a set of five 122-dim discrete
distributions, over the 11 × 11 maze size, including an ad-
ditional dimension for a prediction that that the object is
absent). For the belief head, we used a 3-layer convnet
with 32 channels and ReLU nonlinearities, followed by a
softmax. This added a term to the training loss: the cross
entropy between the current belief state and the true current
world state. The loss for the belief prediction was scaled by
an additional hyperparameter, swept over the values 0.5, 2,
and 5.
E. Additional results
Model Train agents Test agents
Action loss
none 1.14 1.12
char net 0.84 0.86
+ shuffled echar 1.61 1.62
mental net 0.83 0.98
+ shuffled emental 1.61 1.65
both 0.72 0.73
+ shuffled echar 1.57 1.69
+ shuffled emental 1.16 1.20
+ shuffled both 1.99 2.02
Consumption loss
none 0.34 0.36
char net 0.19 0.16
+ shuffled echar 0.83 0.77
mental net 0.32 0.30
+ shuffled emental 0.43 0.43
both 0.16 0.14
+ shuffled echar 0.82 0.78
+ shuffled emental 0.23 0.23
+ shuffled both 0.83 0.77
Successor loss
none 2.48 2.53
char net 2.23 2.21
+ shuffled echar 3.17 3.13
mental net 2.36 2.29
+ shuffled emental 2.92 2.80
both 2.16 2.04
+ shuffled echar 3.27 3.19
+ shuffled emental 2.45 2.33
+ shuffled both 3.53 3.31
Table A1. Full table of losses for the three predictions in Fig 7.
For each prediction, we report the loss obtained by a trained ToM-
net that had no character or mental net, had just a character net,
just a mental net, or both. For each model, we quantify the im-
portance of the embeddings echar and emental by measuring the
loss when echar,i and emental,i are shuffled within a minibatch.
The middle column shows the loss for the ToMnet’s predictions
on new samples of behaviour from the agents used in the trained
set. The right column shows this for agents in the test set.
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Figure A1. ToMnet performance on the Natural Sally-Anne
test does not depend on the ToMnet observing swap events
during training. The left two columns show the data presented
in Fig 12 and Fig 13. The rightmost column shows the predictions
of the ToMnet when it is trained on data from the same agents, but
rolled out on POMDPs where the probability of swap events was
p = 0 instead of p = 0.1.
F. Additional notes
F.1. Hypersensitivity of 3× 3 agents to swap events
with swap distance 1
In Fig 12c, the policies of agents with 3 × 3 fields of view
are seen to be considerably more sensitive to swap events
that occur adjacent to the agent than the agents with 9 × 9
fields of view. Agents with 5×5 and 7×7 had intermediate
sensitivities.
We did not perform a systematic analysis of the policy dif-
ferences between these agents, but we speculate here as to
the origin of this phenomenon. As we note in the main
text, the agents were competent at their respective tasks, but
not optimal. In particular, we noted that agents with larger
fields of view were often sluggish to respond behaviourally
to swap events. This is evident in the example shown on the
left hand side of Fig 10. Here an agent with a 5× 5 field of
view does not respond to the sudden appearance of its pre-
ferred blue object above it by immediately moving upwards
to consume it; its next-step policy does shift some proba-
bility mass to moving upwards, but only a small amount
(Fig 10c). It strongly adjusts its policy on the following
step though, producing rollouts that almost always return
directly to the object (Fig 10d). We note that when a swap
event occurs immediately next to an agent with a relatively
large field of view (5 × 5 and greater), such an agent has
the luxury of integrating information about the swap events
over multiple timesteps, even if it navigates away from this
location. In contrast, agents with 3×3 fields of view might
take a single action that results in the swapped object dis-
appearing altogether from their view. There thus might be
greater pressure on these agents during learning to adjust
their next-step actions in response to neighbouring swap
events.
F.2. Use of Jensen-Shannon Divergence
In Sections 3.4–3.5, we used the Jensen-Shannon Diver-
gence (DJS) to measure the effect of swap events on
agents’ (and the ToMnet’s predicted) behaviour (Figs 12-
13). We wanted to use a standard metric for changes to
all the predictions (policy, successors, and beliefs), and we
found that the symmetry and stability of DJS was most
suited to this. We generally got similar results when using
the KL-divergence, but we typically found more variance
in these estimates: DKL is highly sensitive the one of the
distributions assigning little probability mass to one of the
outcomes. This was particularly problematic when mea-
suring changes in the successor representations and belief
states, which were often very sparse. While it’s possible
to tame the the KL by adding a little uniform probability
mass, this involves an arbitrary hyperparameter which we
preferred to just avoid.
G. Version history
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• Initial submission to arxiv.
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introduction.
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